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It is with some diffidence that I enter the present discussion on the dialectical
obligations of arguers, an issue which has been so competently discussed,
both by professor Johnson (1996,1998, 1999) and by professor Govier (1998,
1998a). They already reached agreement on many points, and I do not think
they are waiting for me (or anyone) to act as an arbiter on remaining
differences.
But, to discharge my obligations as a commentator, I shall make some brief
remarks on professor Johnson's latest contribution to this ongoing
metadialectic. Johnson mentions two objections that would subvert his thesis
(Section IIIB). He does not get back to them at the end of the paper. So it
might be worthwhile to see whether these objections can now be dissolved.
Johnson's distinction between a phase of argument construction and a
revising phase will greatly facilitate this task.
 1. Does It Make Sense to Speak of Dialectical Obligations?
 1.1 The Phase of Argument Construction
To speak of obligations one needs a normative context, some standards of
behavior that may not be universally valid, but nevertheless hold for a particular
context or professional practice. The practice of argumentation provides such
a context. Or rather a number of such contexts. For instance, in critical
discussion there is the obligation to abide by the rules of dialogue, that is: not
to commit a fallacy (in the pragma-dialectical sense of fallacy). This is a first
level obligation. There is also the second level obligation to try to do well in the
dialogue. Perhaps both may be called "dialectical obligations", but they must
be distinguished. (Compare a commitment to play chess according to the
rules versus a commitment to play as well as one can.)
Solo argument provides a different set of contexts. Here, too, one may
distinguish different levels of obligation. On the first level the solo arguer has to
fulfill certain minimal requirements, such as providing what Walton and I called
an elementary argument (1995), and others have dubbed a Claims-Reasons
Complex or an Illative Core, but in order to do really well, there are further
requirements to fulfill. Again, these further requirements depend on what
exactly is the task at hand. What purpose is the argument supposed to serve?
At present I shall assume that this purpose is to rationally convince an
audience to accept some claim. But it should be noted that in some contexts
arguments may be presented to serve some other purposes such as
presenting a contribution to an ongoing discussion or arousing interest in
some considerations.
If the arguer is committed to this goal of rationally convincing a certain
audience, some more detailed obligations can be derived. They may well be
called "dialectical obligations". What the arguer needs to do (at least) is to
present an argument (or a case, or an argumentation) that is capable of
rationally convincing each person of his audience. (Whether each person is
actually convinced will be another matter.) This can be made more precise:
An argument A  for a claim C is capable to rationally convince a person X if
and only if X can from this argument construct a critical discussion D, such
that:
          (1)         D contains no fallacies;
          (2)         D is a plausible critical discussion between X and the arguer,
with the arguer as the Proponent of C and X as its Opponent;
          (3)         D is won by the arguer and lost by X.
Notice that if an argument is capable to rationally convince a person, it may yet
fail to do so since the person in question, notwithstanding the opportunity
offered, may actually fail to construct a dialogue with the three properties listed
above.
Thus one may see that an arguer in order to complete this task may need to
address objections, alternative positions, criticisms and challenges (Johnson,
1999: 5).
Challenges, by the way, may require the arguer to construct not only an
elementary argument but also arguments supporting premises of this
elementary argument and arguments supporting premises of these arguments,
and so on, leading to a tree-formed argument structure. (In Walton and
Krabbe, 1995, such a more complicated argument is called a basic
argument.)
Even without taking the issue of objections into consideration, the dynamics of
challenges may seem to lead to the Regress Problem, but it does not. The
arguer's task is, after all, limited to presenting a structure capable of
convincing a certain audience. In many cases a finitary structure will suffice to
realize this possibility. If not, well, then the arguer cannot fulfill his obligations;
so what? Not all claims need to be defendable. Often, however, even an
elementary argument may suffice to carry conviction (It's Saturday. So they'll
close at five).
Thus we see that it makes perfectly sense to speak of an arguer's dialectical
obligations in a given context of argument. Of course, Johnson wants to go
beyond the obligation to present a basic argument. For instance, according to
him, the arguer should construct his argument in such a way that it deals with
salient objections. But this does not change the story. I agree that salient
objections must be handled, if otherwise the argument would be incapable of
carrying conviction. So I agree that the arguer may have dialectical obligations
in this respect. On the other hand, in some cases no salient objections may be
present, so the obligation to handle objections would dissipate.
It should also be noted that an obligation to handle objections can, in solo
argument, be dealt with within the structure of a basic argument. As Francisca
Snoeck Henkemans (1992: 97) has shown, objections can be countered by
complementary arguments that are part of this basic structure (cf. also
Freeman, 1991, Sections 6.6, 7.3 on counterrebuttals). Finally, the obligation
to deal with objections need not lead to a Regress Problem, since not in all
cases of argumentation is it required that the arguer deal with further
objections (that he present a complimentary argument) in order to construct an
argument capable of rationally convincing a particular audience.
  
1.2 The Phase of revision
Thus far I have discussed the dialectical obligations in the phase of argument
construction, let us now turn to the revising phase. Is there any dialectical
obligation for the solo arguer to respond to actual objections brought forward
after publication of the argument? To respond to such objections equals to
entering a critical discussion with the objector as one's interlocutor. Now it
seems that dialectical obligations concern the ways one should perform
certain tasks in an argumentative discussion or in presenting an argument, not
the question whether one should enter some discussion at all. This is not to
deny that one may feel obligated to respond, either for external reasons, or
because one wants to preserve the original argument's power to convince, or
perhaps simply to be true to oneself. Only, such an obligation would not be
"dialectical", at least not on the same level as before. This, basically, solves
the Discrimination Problem: as far as dialectical obligations go, the arguer is
free to respond to or to neglect critical reactions.
Once the arguer decides to preserve the original argument's power to
convince (or to defend an amended version of the original argument), this will
create new or renewed dialectical obligations. As the e-mail box fills up with
objections, the arguer is confronted with the Discrimination Problem. Since the
goal is to keep the original argument (or a revised version) in business, it is
most urgent to treat those objections that create the appearance that one's
argument has been utterly refuted. That is to say: the arguer is foremost
obligated to deal with the serious objections. On this I agree with Johnson.
Can dialectical obligations be specified?
This is a type of question that cannot be answered a priori. Of course
dialectical obligations are highly context dependent and governed by
numerous features. The problems are closely analogous with those concerned
with the specification of premise adequacy (Blair, 1995). In both areas,
however, this context dependence does not prejudge the extent to which some
theoretical observations will hit the mark. Johnson and Govier have taken
some steps. Others will take others.
The present discussion has borne out that a more thorough theory and
classification of objections may provide important underpinnings for a more
specific theory of dialectical obligations. Empirical studies, too, are called for.
In this context, it would be a good idea to reread what Finnocchiaro (1980, Ch.
17) has to say about the active evaluation of reasoning.
One dialectical obligation, however, is fairly simple to specify: be brief. So,
here I shall end my commentary.
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